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Misuse is frequently raised in
products liability cases.
Sometimes it bars recovery
and sometimes it does not.
This article discusses the
appropriate method of
analysis for determining the
significance of alleged
misuse in any given case.
MISUSE IS PUZZLING. Some-
times it cuts off liability and sometimes it
does not, but courts have failed to clarify
exactly what sort of conduct qualifies as
the type of misuse that bars recovery.
Generally speaking misuse takes two
forms, abnormal use and mishandling.
Abnormal use comes about when a
product is used for an improper pur-
pose;I mishandling comes about when a
product is used for a proper purpose but
in an improper manner. 2 Under this
definition defendants can claim that
virtually any unusual handling or use of a
product constitutes misuse. Yet courts
will not always accept this characteriza-
tion. They frequently explain their re-
sults by stating that liability is cut off
only if the misuse is unforeseeable.
However, they use foreseeability in an
artificial sense in such cases, more as a
way of stating a conclusion than as an
analytical device for determining what
conclusion to reach. This has created an
air of uncertainty with regard to the type
of conduct that truly qualifies as misuse.
This article will describe how to iden-
tify the situations where misuse will bar
liability and the situations where it will
not. To do this it is necessary to examine
the nature of the products liability sys-
tem and evaluate the role that misuse
plays in that system.
NEGATING DEFECT. Misuse is
normally relevant in products liability
litigation because it negates the exis-
tence of defect. Missouri has adopted
the Restatement of Torts (Second)
§402A3 as the basis for imposing strict
liability. 4 The Restatement imposes lia-
* In an earlier article this author discussed
applicability of comparative negligence to
misuse. See, Fischer, Products Liability -
Applicability of Comparative Negligence to
Misuse and Assumption of the Risk, 43 Mo.
L. REv. 643 (1978). Some of the ideas dis-
cussed in that article are parallel to the ideas
discussed herein, although the context of the
discussion is different.
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bility only for defective products. 5 A
comment to the Restatement states that
a "product is not in a defective condition
when it is safe for normal handling and
consumption."-6 Consequently, "the
seller is not liable if the injury results
from abnormal handling. . . or from ab-
normal consumption. . . .-7 These
comments make clear that misuse can
prevent a product from being defective.
In order to understand how misuse ne-
gates defect it is necessary to examine
the test of defect used by the Restate-
ment.
The Restatement uses a two-part test
for determining defectiveness. A prod-
uct is defective if it is "in a condition not
contemplated by the ultimate con-
sumer, which will be unreasonably
dangerous to him."" In order to be de-
fective a product must meet both of
these tests, i.e., it must possess an un-
expected danger and the danger must be'
unreasonable.
Courts often mistake misuse for an
affirmative defense, 9 when actually
plaintiff must prove proper use. 10 The
mistake becomes obvious when you
consider that the effect of misuse is to
negate defect, which is an essential ele-
ment of plaintiffs case.
Misuse can negate both aspects of the
Restatement test of defect. This article
will describe how this works by dis-
cussing the two tests separately.
CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS
TEST. The first part of the two-part test
is known as the consumer expectations
test. It protects consumers from unex-
pected dangers arising from the use of
products. Under this test a product is
deemed nondefective if the danger it
poses is either obvious," generally
known, 1 2 or has been adequately
warned against. 13 In order to be defec-
tive under this test the product must be
"dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to
the community as to its characteris-
tics."14
Misuse can prevent a product from
being defective on the basis that con-
sumer expectations have not been vio-
lated. For example, suppose plaintiff
uses an axe to cut his toenails and inad-
vertently amputates his toe because he
misjudges his aim. Plaintiff would have
no action against the manufacturer of the
axe because it was not defective. Con-
sumer expectations were not violated
because any reasonable consumer
would recognize that an axe cannot
safely be used for such a purpose. On
this basis it has been held that a shoe is
not defective if it harms the plaintiffs
foot because he buys the wrong size, 15 a
baby food jar is not defective if it breaks
because plaintiff tries to open it with a
beer can opener, 16 and a paint container
is not defective because its volatile con-
tents explode when plaintiff tries to cut
it in half with an acetylene torch. 17
UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS
TEST. The second part of the Restate-
ment Test of Defect, is that the product
be unreasonably dangerous. A product
is defective under this test if its utility is
outweighed by the gravity of harm,
threatened by its use. ' 8 Some courts dis-
tinguish this test from negligence by
using hindsight at the time of trial rather
than foresight at the time of manufacture
to determine whether the danger is rea-
sonable.' 9 Missouri has apparently
adopted this approach.2 0 The question is
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Misuse will sometimes
prevent a product from
being defective on the
basis that the product is
not unreasonably
dangerous
whether a reasonable person with full
knowledge of the danger posed by the
product and of feasible design alterna-
tives would market the product in the
same fashion as the defendant.
2 1
Under this test a product containing a
manufacturing defect that causes harm
would normally be defective. A man-
ufacturing defect results from a miscar-
riage in the manufacturing process that
produces a product in an unintended
condition, e.g., a physically flawed
product such as a tire with a weak spot in
the side wall that poses the danger of a
blowout. Such a product would nor-
mally be defective because a reasonable
person with knowledge of the flaw and
the danger would normally choose to
withhold it from the market.
However, products that contain no
physical flaw but are allegedly defective
because of the way they are designed
will be non-defective under this test if
they meet three requirements: The risk
posed by the design must be one that
cannot be eliminated "in the present
state of human knowledge";2 2 the ap-
parent utility of the product must justify
its sale notwithstanding the danger;
23
and the manufacturer must give an ap-
propriate warning.2 4 A product that
meets these tests is not defective be-
cause it is not unreasonably dangerous.
The Restatement labels such products
"unavoidably unsafe."2 5 For example,
an automobile can seriously harm its oc--
cupants if it collides head-on with
another car. Yet it is not unreasonably
dangerous because automobiles have
great utility and cannot be made safe for
use in such accidents.
26
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Misuse will sometimes prevent a
product from being defective on the
basis that the product is not unreason-
ably dangerous. Suppose the plaintiff
uses a set of automobile battery booster
cables to tow a disabled car. The cables
break because they are not strong
enough to withstand the tension and an
accident results. Because of the misuse
the cables are not defective. Even if the
consumer expectations test of defect is
violated because consumers would not
expect booster cables to break under
such circumstances, the cables would
still not be defective under the unrea-
sonably dangerous test of defect. The
cables contained no physical flaw and
are not defective in design. They are
made of copper wire, which has low ten-
sile strength, because it is a superior
conductor of electricity. The utility of
the product as designed greatly out-
weighs the gravity of harm. Therefore,
the design was not unreasonably
dangerous because a reasonable man
with knowledge of the risk would still
sell the product.2 7 It might technologi-
cally be possible to make a booster cable
that can also be used as a tow cable. For
example, a third cable made of steel
might be included along with the two
copper cables. Yet the product is not
defective because it is reasonable to
market booster cables without this
added feature.
28
Hays v. Western Auto Supply Co.
29
illustrates that misuse can prevent a
harmful product from being deemed un-
reasonably dangerous. The operator of a
riding mower backed over a young
child. The child was injured because the
machine was designed without a rear
blade guard. The court found for the
defendant on the basis that the mower
was reasonably fit for the intended use of
cutting grass with children kept away. A
rear guard was not reasonably necessary
because the tip of the blade was twelve
to fourteen inches from the rear of the
machine. Therefore, even if a person
came into contact with the rear of the
machine he could not be injured by the
blade. The manufacturer could not
foresee that the mower would be backed
against a young child, causing him to fall
down and to be run over by the mower.
Hays was decided under an implied
warranty theory before strict tort liabil-
ity was adopted in Missouri, but the
principle is the same. Strict liability in
tort was derived from the law of war-
ranty and imposes essentially the same
liability in personal injury and property
damage cases as implied warranty, ex-
cept that contract defenses such as
notice, disclaimer, and privity are not
recognized. 30 The implied warranty is
that goods be reasonably fit for ordinary
use. 3 1 The Restatement requirement
that goods not be unreasonably danger-
ous is merely the converse of the im-
plied warranty requirement that a prod-
uct be reasonably fit. 32 The Missouri
courts recognize that there is no sub-
stantive difference between the two
theories. 33 A Restatement jurisdiction
would reach the same result in Hays by
saying that the mower was not unrea-
sonably dangerous when used properly
rather than by saying it was reasonably
fit for its intended use.
Up to now we have been concerned
with products that are alleged to be un-
reasonably dangerous because of the
Products can also be
unreasonably dangerous
because of a failure to
warn
way they are designed, but products can
also be unreasonably dangerous because
of a failure to warn. Even if the danger
arising from the design of a product is
unavoidable, the manufacturer will have
to give a warning if two conditions are
met. First, the danger must be one that
he should reasonably know about.
34
Second, the warning must be necessary
because it is not generally known.
35
Misuse can prevent a product from
being unreasonably dangerous on a fail-
ure to warn theory if it is unforeseeable.
In the case of the automobile battery
booster cables that are used to tow a car,
the cables are not unreasonably danger-
ous because of a failure to warn. No
warning is necessary because this mis-
use is not reasonably foreseeable.
If the misuse is
foreseeable, a product
can be unreasonably
dangerous because of a
failure to warn
If the misuse is foreseeable, a product
can be unreasonably dangerous because
of a failure to warn. In Higgins v. Paul
Hardeman, Inc.36 a control rod which
activated the hydraulic lift mechanism
on a dump truck was exposed when the
bed was raised. The driver raised the
bed and crawled under it to oil some
parts without shoring up the bed. The
bed fell when he inadvertently kicked
the control rod, and he was crushed to
death. Crawling under the bed of the
truck without shoring it up was not the
sort of abnormal use that would cut off
liability because it was foreseeable, and
thus the truck was unreasonably
dangerous. It should have been de-
signed to be safe for this use, or the
manufacturer should have warned that
shoring must be used.
Only an adequate warning will pre-
vent a product from being unreasonably
dangerous. In Rogers v. Toro Man-
ufacturing Co., 37 a person cutting grass
with defendant's self-propelled lawn
mower put the drive mechanism in
neutral and emptied the grass bag while
the engine was still running. Vibrations
from the engine caused the drive
mechanism to engage, the mower
moved forward, ran into a child in the
vicinity, and injured him. Defendant
argued that the accident resulted from
misuse because the owner's manual
cautioned against leaving the mower
unattended while the engine was run-
ning. The court held that the manual
was not admissible to show misuse be-
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cause it failed to explain the reason that
the mower should always be attended
while the engine was running. This de-
cision is correct because misuse did not
negate either of the Restatement tests of
defect. The mower violated consumer
expectations because the danger was
unknown, and it was unreasonably
dangerous because a reasonable person
would have warned about this danger.
No warning at all is
required if the danger is
obvious because it
would serve no useful
purpose
No warning at all is required if the
danger is obvious because it would serve
no useful purpose. An axe is not unrea-
sonably dangerous because of a failure to
warn against using it to cut toenails.
A product that is safe for use in ac-
cordance with adequate instructions is
not defective because harm results from
misuse in violation of those instruc-
tions. 38 A tire that blows out because it is
used on the wrong size wheel or because
it is inflated with the wrong amount of
air pressure is not defective. 39 Con-
sumer expectations have not been vio-
lated because the danger is either
known or has been warned against, and
the product is not unreasonably danger-
ous because its utility outweighs the
gravity of harm threatened by the possi-
bility that someone will ignore the direc-
tions and cause an accident.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF
DEFECT. Circumstantial evidence can
sometimes be used to prove that a prod-
uct was defective in some way even
though the specific defect cannot be
identified. In some cases evidence of
malfunction alone can create an infer-
ence that the product must have been
defective. Failure of a car's steering
mechanism to turn the car in the direc-
tion in which it is steered creates the
308-Journal of Missouri Bar-Jul.-Aug. 1979
inference that the mechanism is defec-
tive.
40
Misuse can negate the existence of
defect in such cases by preventing the
inference from arising. Sufficient evi-
dence of defect at the time the product
left defendant's control must be pre-
sented so that the jury does not have to
speculate. 41 Misuse or alteration of a
product after it leaves the hands of the
manufacturer can prevent the inference
of defect from arising if the jury has no
basis for deciding whether the defect
was caused at the time of manufacture or
at the time of the misuse. 42 Suppose the
suspension of a passenger car fails after
long use as an off the road vehicle. The
car is defective, but it is not clear that
the defect existed prior to the abnormal
use.
PROXIMATE CAUSE. Misuse may
sometimes prevent a harm from being a
proximate result of a defect. Normally in
strict liability cases the defendant is not
liable for injuries resulting from a differ-
ent hazard than the one that warrants
the imposition of liability.4 3 For exam-
ple, liability is not imposed for blasting
which causes a mother mink to eat her
young. 44 Blasting is an abnormally
dangerous activity because of the hazard
of damage caused by concussion rather
than damage caused by fright. This situ-
ation could also arise in a products lia-
bility case. Suppose a soda bottle con-
tains a flaw which creates the risk of
explosion. The contents are consumed
without mishap. Plaintiff then uses it to
pry two heavy objects apart. Because of
the flaw the bottle breaks and plaintiff is
injured. The bottle is defective because
it presents an unreasonable danger of
exploding and consumer expectations
are violated because the flaw is hidden.
Yet since a different hazard than the one
that made the bottle unreasonably
dangerous produced the harm, a court
might well hold that there is no prox-
imate cause.
FORESEEABLE MISUSE. Courts
frequently say that misuse cuts off lia-
bility if it is unforeseeable but not
otherwise. 45 These statements cannot
be taken literally. It is true that
foreseeability is often a relevant consid-
eration in determining the effect of mis-
use, but it is not always controlling.
Cases will arise where the defendant is
held liable notwithstanding foreseeable
misuse.
Foreseeability of misuse





Foreseeability of misuse is often rele-
vant to determining whether a product
is unreasonably dangerous and thus de-
fective. This can be illustrated by com-
paring Rogers v. Toro Manufacturing
Co. 46 with Hays v. Western Auto Supply
Co.47 Rogers involved the self-pro-
pelled lawn mower that slipped into
gear when left unattended with the en-
gine running. The mower presented an
unreasonable danger precisely because
it was foreseeable that it might be mis-
used in this way. As long as it was prop-
erly attended no harm could result. The
mower was unreasonably dangerous be-
cause the misuse was foreseeable. Hays
involved the riding mower without a
rear blade guard that caused harm by
backing over a child laying on the
ground. The mower's design was not un-
reasonably dangerous because it was
unforeseeable that this kind of accident
could happen. A rear blade guard was
not reasonably required because the tip
of the blade was at least a foot away from
the rear of the machine. It was un-
foreseeable that someone would back
the mower over a child. You may dis-
agree with the factual determination in
Hays that this kind of accident is un-
foreseeable, but the principle of the case
is correct. The mower was not unrea-




Foreseeability alone is not always
conclusive. Sometimes a manufacturer
will be held liable even though un-
foreseeable misuse contributed to the
accident. Suppose an eccentric person
uses a brand new concrete truck for
commuting to work every day. The
brakes fail because of a hidden flaw in
the master cylinder, and an accident re-
sults. Use of the truck for this purpose is
abnormal because it was meant for
hauling concrete. The misuse also
caused the harm because the plaintiff
would not have been injured had he
been driving a passenger car instead.
Furthermore, the abnormal use is
clearly unforeseeable when you con-
sider the expense, inconvenience, and
discomfort involved in driving this truck
rather than a passenger car. Yet the mis-
use should not bar plaintiffs recovery.
The truck was defective because the
danger was hidden and unreasonable.
The defect was a proximate cause of the
harm because the defect created the
hazard of loss of control due to brake
failure, and this is the hazard that caused
harm to plaintiff. Therefore, the ele-
ments of plaintiffs case are fully estab-
lished. He is not barred by the affirma-
tive defense of contributory fault be-
cause he did not knowingly encounter
an unreasonable risk of brake failure.
48
The unforeseeable misuse is irrelevant
to any issue in this case and should not
bar recovery.
Conversely, plaintiff may sometimes
be unable to recover in cases where his
foreseeable misuse contributed to the
injury. Suppose plaintiff wears a pair of
track shoes to a movie theater. He slips
on a wet spot on the floor and injures
himself. The manufacturer of the shoes
is not liable even if this use is reasonably
foreseeable. Shoes are not defective
simply because they are capable of los-
ing traction on a wet surface. 49 Con-
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sumer expectations are not violated be-
cause this risk is generally known. The
shoes are not unreasonably dangerous
because they have great utility, and this
outweighs the gravity of harm
threatened by an occasional slip and fall.
Since the product is not defective, the
manufacturer cannot be held liable. The
same result frequently occurs when a
product is used in violation of the man-
ufacturer's instructions. Surely, it is
foreseeable that motorists will some-
times fail to maintain the recommended
amount of air pressure in their tires. Yet
if the tire fails because it has been
over-inflated the manufacturer will not
be held liable. Assuming that an
adequate warning has been given and it
is not feasible to make a safer tire, the
tire is not defective. The risk of blowout
due to'over inflation is reasonable. Thus,
plaintiffs misuse bars recovery even
though it is foreseeable.
Courts tend to force misuse cases into
a foreseeability framework by making
rigid and unrealistic rules about what is
foreseeable. For example, in Polk v.
Ford Motor Company5" the court stated
that an auto manufacturer would not be
liable for failing to make a car that can be
safely crashed off of a cliff because this
constitutes unforeseeable misuse. It is
true the manufacturer would not be li-
able, but not because the misuse is un-
foreseeable. It is quite foreseeable that
cars will crash off cliffs from time to time.
That is the reason that roadbuilders lo-
cate guardrails at such places. The car
manufacturer is not responsible because
the car is not defective. Consumer ex-
pectations are not violated since the
danger is known. The car is not unrea-
sonably dangerous because it has great
utility, and it is not technologically pos-
sible to make one that is crashworthy.
Because foreseeability is used in an arti-
ficial way in misuse cases it is often used
as a way of expressing the court's conclu-
sion rather than as an analytical device
for reaching the conclusion.
CONCLUSION. Suppose you repre-
sent the plaintiff in a products liability
310-Journal of Missouri Bar-jul.-Aug. 1979
Foreseeability cannot be
relied on to always
determine the effect of
misuse
action. You can expect the defendant to
characterize virtually any unusual han-
dling or use of a product as misuse that
cuts off liability. Foreseeability cannot
be relied on to always determine the
effect of misuse. How do you determine
the effect of misuse in your case? The
answer is to systematically analyze the
conduct in light of the role that misuse
plays in the law of products liability.
Misuse is normally relevant because it
negates defect or proximate cause. The
proper approach is to determine first
whether the product is defective under
the Restatement two-part test of defect
If it is, you must determine whether the
defect proximately caused the harm. If it
did the alleged misuse has not negated
any element of your case. The only pos-
sible relevance of the conduct is that it
might constitute an affirmative defense
such as contributory fault. Of course the
defendant bears the burden of proof on
this issue. Assuming the misuse does not
constitute contributory fault it is legally
irrelevant and should have no bearing
on the outcome of your case.
Clarity would be enhanced if courts
would analyze these cases in terms of
defect, causation, and contributory
fault. The term misuse would never
have to be used. However, courts have
developed an affinity for this terminol-
ogy, and lawyers must learn to work
within the framework courts have es-
tablished. El
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